Hmmm ... I would say yes, ... and no.
Yes, because Everett can be said having rendered the quantum facts coherent with a "theory of mind" which has a venerable tradition (mechanism). Indeed, Everett has substituted the unintelligible wave collapse by a mechanist assumption, allowing the observer to obey to the linear wave equation. It has then singled out the necessity of distinguishing third person descriptions (like the Quantum Wave describing a couple observer-observed, and first person descriptions, like the subjectivity of the observer describing its own *relative* memory, and thus has anticipated the rather succesfull decoherence theory (imo).
No, because Everett is not aware (well, few people seems to be aware) that once we assume mechanism or computationalism, the machine are, in principle, confronted to a bigger (a priori) form of indeterminacy, making a priori still stranger the quantum indeterminacy.
If we take seriously the mechanist hypothesis or the computational or digital version (hereafter named comp), we have to justify why the quantum (consistent) histories win the "measure battle" which, with comp, involved many type of possibly non quantum-like histories.
But Everett underestimated without doubt the subtleties of what a self-observing machine can be. It is here that computer science and mathematical logic can offer hope to justify why the quantum laws seems (correctly) to stabilize statistically.
If you want, with comp, matter, and in particular its destructive interference features, seems a priori even *more* weird. We cannot, for the comp-reason decribed above, directly appeal to Gleason theorem or to decoherence theorems, we have to justify that move directly from a more thorough study of what a digital memory machine can prove and guess correctly about herself and her possible histories. It is still possible that such a line would refute the mechanist thesis, but the preliminary results I got seem on the contrary to consolidate the marriage between the quantum and the digital.
Note that such approach could demistify, not only the collapse, but also the relation between consciousness, quasi definable in this setting by unconscious or automatic guesses in a reality (cf Helmholtz), and the quantum reality (capable of stabilizing those guesses through some "entangling" of consistent computational histories.